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Journalistic Investigation

Money is changing.

For centuries, money has been represented by banknotes and coins. Today, central banks around the world are exploring another form of money: Central Bank Digital Currency, or CBDC.

Indonesia is no exception.

Bank Indonesia is developing the Digital Rupiah through Project Garuda, an official framework for exploring a central-bank-issued digital form of the rupiah.

But the important journalistic question is no longer simply:

“Will money become digital?”

The more fundamental question is:

When money becomes digital, who can see the trail, who controls access to the data, and what safeguards protect citizens from abuse?

CBDC IS NOT GOPAY. IT IS NOT A BANK ACCOUNT. IT IS NOT CRYPTO.

A CBDC is digital money issued by a central bank.

Bank Indonesia describes the Digital Rupiah as a direct claim on Bank Indonesia as the issuer. That makes it fundamentally different from ordinary electronic money or commercial-bank deposits.

It is also not cryptocurrency.

CBDC is part of the official monetary system and represents a liability of the issuing central bank.

That distinction matters.

Because when the state changes the architecture of money, the issue is no longer merely technological.

It becomes a question of monetary sovereignty, privacy, cybersecurity and public accountability.

PROJECT GARUDA: INDONESIA HAS ALREADY STARTED THE JOURNEY

Bank Indonesia launched Project Garuda on November 30, 2022, as the framework for developing the Digital Rupiah.

But the public must distinguish between exploration, experimentation and full-scale retail deployment.

The initial stages of Indonesia's Digital Rupiah development have focused heavily on wholesale applications, including issuance, transfer and redemption experiments involving financial institutions.

Therefore, describing Indonesia as having already implemented a fully operational nationwide retail CBDC would go beyond what Bank Indonesia's official documentation establishes.

That distinction is essential.

A pilot is not the same as mass adoption.

A blueprint is not the same as a completed system.

THE WORLD IS EXPLORING CBDCs

Indonesia is part of a much larger global experiment.

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), its 2024 survey of 93 central banks found that 91% of central banks surveyed were exploring retail CBDC, wholesale CBDC, or both. Wholesale CBDC development was generally further advanced than retail CBDC development.

So the widely circulated figure of 86% should not be presented as the latest global statistic.

The newer BIS figure is 91%.

For journalists, numbers without a date and source are not evidence.

They are merely numbers.

DIGITAL MONEY CREATES A DIGITAL TRAIL

Cash works differently from digital payments.

When a cash transaction ends, the physical exchange itself does not automatically create the same kind of centralized digital record that electronic transactions can generate.

Digital transactions, by contrast, can create information about:

• who paid;
• who received;
• how much was transferred;
• when the transaction occurred;
• and, depending on the surrounding systems, additional information about the transaction.

The International Monetary Fund has emphasized that CBDC design raises important questions concerning transaction data, privacy, data storage and access.

That creates a series of questions that deserve public answers:

Who can access transaction data?

Who stores it?

How long is it retained?

Under what legal circumstances can authorities obtain it?

Can citizens challenge an incorrect decision affecting their access to money?

What happens when the system fails?

These are not anti-technology questions.

They are governance questions.

PROGRAMMABLE MONEY: TECHNOLOGY IS NOT THE SAME AS POLICY

One of the most controversial concepts surrounding CBDCs is programmability.

In technical terms, programmable money can be designed to operate according to predetermined conditions.

For example, funds could theoretically be restricted to particular purposes, locations or periods.

International financial institutions have discussed these possibilities as part of the broader CBDC debate.

But a critical distinction must be maintained:

The fact that a technology could theoretically be programmed does not prove that Indonesia intends to make citizens' Digital Rupiah expire, restrict purchases, or freeze funds arbitrarily.

Those are policy claims requiring actual legal and technical evidence.

Journalism must distinguish:

What is technically possible

from

what the government has actually decided to implement.

THE REAL ISSUE: CONCENTRATION OF DATA AND POWER

The central concern is not simply digital money.

It is who controls the infrastructure surrounding digital money.

The more economic activity moves into digital systems, the more valuable payment data becomes.

Transaction information can potentially reveal patterns of economic behavior.

That is why CBDC privacy cannot be treated as a secondary technical issue.

It concerns:

privacy rights,

data protection,

cybersecurity,

consumer protection,

law enforcement,

and limits on institutional power.

mBRIDGE: FACTS MUST COME BEFORE FEAR

Another claim circulating online is that Indonesia's Digital Rupiah is already connected to the mBridge system controlled externally.

The facts require greater precision.

mBridge is a multi-CBDC project involving the BIS Innovation Hub, Bank of Thailand, Central Bank of the UAE, Digital Currency Institute of the People's Bank of China and Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

Its purpose is to explore cross-border payments using distributed-ledger technology.

That does not, by itself, establish that Indonesia's monetary system is controlled by a foreign infrastructure.

International payment cooperation and loss of monetary sovereignty are not synonymous.

The appropriate journalistic question is therefore not:

“Who controls Indonesia's money?”

without evidence.

The better question is:

What technical, legal and governance arrangements will determine Indonesia's control over its own digital monetary infrastructure?

That question can—and should—be investigated.

IDENTITY, BANK ACCOUNTS AND DIGITALIZATION

Indonesia is simultaneously expanding digital financial inclusion and identity-based financial infrastructure.

Government policy has encouraged broader access to bank accounts, while financial systems increasingly use digital identity and payment infrastructure.

The use of the National Identification Number (NIK) as a Taxpayer Identification Number (NPWP) is also part of Indonesia's tax-administration modernization and the broader One Data framework.

These developments should not automatically be treated as one single CBDC system.

They are separate policy and infrastructure initiatives.

But they intersect in one important area:

data.

Identity data.

Financial data.

Payment data.

Tax data.

And eventually, potentially, central-bank digital money data.

That intersection deserves serious public scrutiny.

NIGERIA: A WARNING, BUT GET THE TIMELINE RIGHT

Nigeria is frequently cited in online CBDC discussions as evidence that governments can use cash restrictions to force citizens into digital money.

The historical record is more complicated.

Nigeria introduced major cash-withdrawal restrictions during the naira redesign and cash-management policy implemented in late 2022 and early 2023.

The Central Bank of Nigeria imposed withdrawal limits while encouraging citizens to use electronic payment channels, including digital payment services and the eNaira.

Therefore, stating that Nigeria carried out the same policy in 2021 specifically to force CBDC adoption would be misleading.

The Nigerian experience is still relevant—but the chronology and causal claims matter.

CASHLESS = POWERLESS?

It is an effective question.

But it should remain a question—not become an unsupported conclusion.

A society that relies overwhelmingly on digital payments becomes increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure.

That raises legitimate resilience questions:

What happens during a system outage?

What happens after a cyberattack?

What happens if someone's identity is incorrectly flagged?

What happens if access to an account is suspended?

How quickly can citizens regain access?

Will offline payment mechanisms exist?

What level of transaction privacy will remain?

These are legitimate issues in international CBDC policy discussions.

IS CBDC A “GLOBAL ELITE AGENDA”?

That phrase requires evidence before it can be treated as a factual conclusion.

CBDCs are being explored by central banks across different political and economic systems for different reasons: payment efficiency, financial inclusion, monetary resilience, innovation, cross-border payments and changes in the financial system.

The existence of international coordination does not by itself establish a single secret global agenda.

The journalist's task is not to replace evidence with suspicion.

It is to test power with evidence.

JOURNALISTIC NOTE

CBDC is not automatically a surveillance instrument.

Nor is CBDC automatically harmless.

Its consequences will depend heavily on:

technical architecture,

legislation,

privacy safeguards,

data-access rules,

cybersecurity,

institutional accountability,

and the rights available to citizens.

Therefore, the public does not need technological propaganda.

Nor does it need technological panic.

It needs documents, transparency, verification and accountability.

The central question from WartaGlobal.Id is simple:

When money becomes digital, who holds the keys to the data?

And the question behind it is even more important:

When citizens leave a digital trail every time they spend money, who watches the people who watch the money?

That is where journalism must stand.

Not against technology.

Not as a servant of technology.

But beside the public—asking questions wherever power meets data.

NETTI — INDONESIAN JOURNALIST

Research • Data • Verification • Public Interest • Journalistic Accountability